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which had interpreted Section
1322(b)(2) as protecting only secured
claims. Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that such an interpretation
was reasonable. The Court stated that
Congress chose to use the phrase "claim
secured by" in Section 1322(b)(2), instead of repeating the term of art "secured claim." The Court reasoned that
the word "claim" was broadly defined
in the Code as "any right to payment,"
whether secured or unsecured. In addition, the Court referred to Section 506(a)
which used the phrase "claim secured
by a lien" to encompass both the secured and unsecured portions of an
undersecured claim. Following this
analysis, the Court concluded that the
phrase "a claim secured by only a lien
on the debtor's home" referred to the
entire claim, including both the secured
and the unsecured portions of the claim.
The Supreme Court stated that this
interpretation was the most reasonable
because Section 1322(b)(2) would be
impossible to administer using the approach suggested by the Nobelmans.
The Nobelmans could not modify the
terms of the unsecured portion of their
loan without also modifying the secured portion. Preserving the interest
rate and the monthly payments specified in the note after reducing the principal to $23,500 would dramatically
reduce the term of the note. In addition,
the Court held that since the loan was an
adjustable rate mortgage, this fact alone
indicated that Section 1322(b)(2) could
not operate with Section 506(a) in the
manner suggested by the Nobelmans.
Neither the mortgage contract nor the
Bankruptcy Code suggested any basis
for recalculating the amortization schedule of adjustable rate mortgages.
As a result, the Supreme Court determined that dividing the undersecured
homestead lender's claim into its secured and unsecured parts would modify
the rights of the creditor whose claim
was secured only by a lien on the
debtor's home. In the Nobelman's case,
American's interest was only secured
by a lien on the Nobelman's home.
Thus, the Supreme Court could not allow the Nobelmans to divide their mort-

gage into secured and uns ecured parts
because such a bifurcation v ,ould clearly
violate Section 1322(b )(2) of the
Bankrupcty Code. *
Kathie Yoo

Title Company Must
Sustain Loss Cau sed By
Closing Attorney'sS Theft
of Mortgage Mone y
In Sears Mortgage Co rp. v. Rose,
1993 WL 283309 (N.J.), tIhe New Jersey Supreme Court found tIhat a closing
attorney retained by the pu rhasern af
real estate transaction was the agent of
the title insurance company in its dealings with the purchaser in effectuating
title insurance. According ly, the court
held that the title insuran e company
was liable for the closing Sattorney's
theft of money earmarked for the payment and satisfaction of an existing
first mortgage on the pro tperty. The
court also held that the titl e insurance
company breached its du ty of good
faith and fair dealing by fail ing to make
its insured aware that there was an insurable risk of attorney defaIlcation (the
failure of one entrusted witth money to
pay over when it is due to a nother) and
also by failing to expressly provide or
offer insurance coverage ft r that risk.
One Party Must Ultimatelty Bear the
Loss
In August 1987, Emery: Kaiser contracted to buy Michael Rosse's condominium. Kaiser provided thhe money to
buy the condominium by selling his
house. Kaiser retained Jose ph Gillen, a
real-estate attorney, to repreesent him in
both transactions. Gillen wr ote to Commonwealth Land Title Insurrance Company (Commonwealth) requ esting a title
insurance policy for Kaiser. Gillen also
wrote to Sears Mortgage Corporation
(Sears) requesting a mortg age payoff
statement on Rose's con dominium.
Commonwealth conducted a title search
and sent Gillen its title insu rance com-

mitment which listed Gillen as an "applicant" and Kaiser as the "proposed
insured." The commitment stated that
the policy would be subject to certain
requirements. Those requirements
were: payment of the purchase price to
the seller, payment of the premium for
the policy, proper signing of a proposed
deed from Rose to Kaiser, and that the
mortgage from Rose to Sears be "paid
and cancelled of record." Commonwealth only sent the policy to Gillen
despite the policy's language specifically directing it to the insured.
On October 17, 1987, on a form
provided by Commonwealth, Gillen
informed the insurance company that
the closing had taken place and asked it
to perform its final search and issue a
fee policy. Instead of sending Sears
funds to pay off Rose's mortgage, Gillen
misappropriated the closing funds from
the Rose-Kaiser transaction as well as
the closing funds from Kaiser's other
transactions. Gillen absconded with
the money and was later criminally
convicted, imprisoned, and disbarred.
The trial court held that Commonwealth was liable to Kaiser for breach
of its duty of good faith, fair dealing,
and full disclosure. The court also
found that Gillen had been
Commonwealth's agent in its dealings
with Kaiser and thus Commonwealth
would be liable for Gillen's misconduct under the law of agency. The court
ordered Commonwealth to pay off the
Sears' mortgage and to issue Kaiser an
owner's title-insurance policy free of
the Sears' mortgage encumbrance.
The appellate division reversed the
trial court's judgment. The appellate
division refused to impose liability on
Commonwealth because Kaiser's insurance policy did not include a provision protecting him from the risk of
attorney misappropriation of funds. The
Appellate Division also found that
Gillen
was
Kaiser's,
not
Commonwealth's agent.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed and reinstated the trial court's
judgment against Commonwealth. The
case turned on the specific relationships between the parties and their roles
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and responsibilities in completing a real
estate title closing.
Relationships Between the Parties
Implicate Principlesof Agency
The New Jersey Supreme Court first
considered whether the relationships
implicated principles of agency. The
court stated that an agency relationship
is created when one party consents to
have another act on its behalf with the
principal controlling and directing the
acts of the agent, although direct control of the principal over the agent is not
absolutely necessary. As a result, the
court examined the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an
agency relationship existed.
Critical to the issue of agency in this
case was the specific role and functions
undertaken by Gillen and the extent to
which those activities were authorized
and directed by Commonwealth. The
court noted that the closing took place
in the northern part of the state. The
court found the location significant because it shed light on the function of
title insurance carriers in effectuating
real estate closings, the role and responsibilities of the closing attorney,
and the relationship between the attorney and the title insurance carrier. In
southern New Jersey, many purchasers
do not have their own attorneys. The
title company's representative, a "title
agent," attends the closing. Conversely,
in northern New Jersey, title insurance
carriers do not use their own employees
or "title agents" to supervise real estate
title closings. Instead, the title insurance companies rely on the purchaser's
attorney to perform the functions of the
title agent. The attorneys must be approved and perform the functions for
the title insurer in the same way as a
title agent in southern New Jersey.
The court found sufficient indicia of
Commonwealth's control over Gillen
to support an agency relationship. First,
all communication was between Commonwealth and Gillen. Second, Commonwealth gave Gillen its blank forms
to use. Third, in the title commitment,
Commonwealth directed Gillen to pay
off and cancel the Sears mortgage. FiVolume 6 Number 1/Fall 1993

nally, Commonwealth sent Gillen the
title insurance policy and billed him
directly for insurance premiums.
Court Rejects Title Company's Arguments
Commonwealth counted the agency
arguments by claiming that buyers do
not rely on title insurers to protect them
against losses caused by closing attorneys. The court responded by stating
that while reliance is usually essential
to establish an agency relationship based
on apparent authority, it is not essential
to an agency relationship predicated on
actual authority, whether express or
implied. The court also stated that
reliance, to the extent it supports an
agency relationship, need not be predicated on the title insurer's express assurances that it will protect the buyer
against losses occasioned by an
attorney's misconduct. Instead, reliance may be imputed when the title
insurer does not deal directly with the
purchaser, but conducts business
through the attorney who is acting on
the behalf of both the title insurance
company and the client.
Commonwealth further argued that
title insurance carriers are statutorily
permitted to send insurance policies
and all other papers to the attorney
rather than to their prospective insureds.
The court responded by stating that this
statutory authority does not alter the
status of the attorney as the agent of the
title insurer with respect to the functions performed by the attorney for the
insurer, nor does it alter the fact that the
purchaser is compelled to rely on the
attorney as the representative of the
carrier. The court also noted that the
practice by title insurers of interacting
directly with attorneys was based on
business judgment, convenience, and
practicality, not simply on statutory
authority.
In attempting to refute the finding of
agency, Commonwealth further argued
that it no longer required an application
in order for an attorney to be "approved,"
nor did it perform an investigation of
the attorney to check into his or her
qualifications. The court responded
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that the argument did not demonstrate
an absence of control over the approval
of attorneys, but only that such control
is not fully exercised by insurers.
LiabilityBasedOn Duty of GoodFaith
and FairDealing
The trial court held that Commonwealth was liable primarily on the
grounds that it had breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The New
Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that
Commonwealth knew of the risk of
attorney misappropriation of funds as
evidenced by the protection it offered
institutional lenders. Therefore, Commonwealth had a duty either to give
Kaiser an opportunity to insure himself
against the risk or, at the very least, to
inform him that he was not covered
against such a risk. In order to inform
Kaiser of that coverage omission, Commonwealth would have had to undertake some form of direct communication with him. The court stated that
Commonwealth's business reasons for
communication only with attorneys
cannot surmount its duty of good faith
and fair dealing to its insured. The
court held that because Commonwealth
was liable for the attorney's misappropriation, it had to protect the purchaser
against the loss. Commonwealth was
ordered to pay off and cancel the existing Sears' mortgage as an equitable
remedy.
Avoiding Future Risks of Attorney
Misappropriation
In addition to resolving the issues
affecting the parties, the court also announced several broad rules or standards, the purpose of which is to avoid
or reduce the risk of attorney misappropriation committed in the course of real
estate title closings. First, in its communications, the title insurance carrier
must inform the attorney that he will be
performing essential functions on behalf of the carrier, will be deemed the
agent of the carrier, and that the carrier
will prescribe the procedures for all
disbursements. This communication
must be sent to the purchaser. Second,
the carrier may prescribe requirements
29
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for the approval and control of closing
attorneys that will reduce the risks that
irresponsible or unqualified attorneys
will misappropriate, misuse, or mishandle closing funds. Finally, if the
purchaser insists on retaining his or her
own attorney, regardless of approval by
the insurer, the title-insurance carrier
shall advise the purchaser of the risk of
attorney misappropriation, and indicate
that it is a risk that is or may be covered
by the title-insurance policy.
The court realized that these directives were new, and that the matters
addressed were complex, controversial,
and relatively unsettled. Therefore, the
court directed the Supreme Court's
Committee on Civil Practice to confer
with experts in the legal profession and
the real estate field, to review and study
the espoused directives and to provide
the court with its recommendations. oJoyce E. Raupp

Physician Cannot Deduct
Home Office That Is Not
Principal Place of
Business
In Commissioner v. Soliman, 113
S.Ct. 701 (1993), the United States
Supreme Court held that a self-employed physician was not entitled to tax
deductions for a home office which did
not qualify as his principal place of
business. The Court, in reversing the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
limited the definition of a principal place
of business to that location where the
physician spent the most time providing actual medical treatment.
Physician's Use of Home Office
Nader E. Soliman, an anesthesiologist, spent thirty to thirty-five hours per
week administering anesthesia and postoperative care in three hospitals. None
of these hospitals provided him with an
30

office. In addition, he spent two to
three hours per day at home working in
a room used exclusively as an office.
While Soliman did not meet with patients in this office, he performed a
variety of business tasks there, including preparation, billing, professional
phone contacts, and continuing education.
In 1983, Soliman claimed federal
income tax deductions for the portion
of his household expenses attributable
to his home office. The Internal Revenue Service Commissioner (Commissioner) disallowed these deductions,
ruling that the home office was not
Soliman's principal place of business
under 26 U.S.C. Section 280A(c)(1)(A).
Soliman petitioned the Tax Court
for review of the Commissioner's decision. The Tax Court reversed, holding
that Soliman's home office qualified as
his principal place of business. In so
doing, the court abandoned the "focal
point" test which identified the place
where services were performed and income generated as the principal place
of business. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adopting
the Tax Court's test. This test involved
evaluating the home office as the principal place of business in terms of its
essential functions to the taxpayer's
business, the amount of time the taxpayer spent there, and the availability
of other locations for performing the
business office functions.
The Commissioner appealed this
ruling to the United States Supreme
Court. Due to the different interpretations of the statute among circuits, the
Court granted certiorari in order to
address the issue of whether a home
office qualifies as a taxpayer's principal place of business under 26 U.S.C.
Section 280A(c)(1)(A).
Principal Place of Business Requires
a Comparative Analysis
The Supreme Court first looked to
the language of the revenue statute.
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code allows a taxpayer to deduct all
ordinary and necessary business expenses. However, Section 280A(c)(1)

qualifies this provision, prohibiting
deductions attributable to the taxpayer's
residence. To deduct expenses attributable to the business use of the their
homes, taxpayers must qualify for one
of the three exceptions contained in
Section
Section 280A(c)(1).
280A(c)(1)(A) allows for a deduction
if the home office qualifies as the
taxpayer's principal place of business.
In examining the statute, the Court noted
that the applicable language does not
refer to the principal office. Instead, it
refers to the principal location, suggesting a comparative analysis of all
the places where business is transacted.
The Court rejected the application
of an objective formula, known as the
focal point test, for deciding whether a
home office is the principal place of
business. The focal point test determines the principal place of business as
that place where business contacts occur. Nevertheless, the Court found this
test misleading as it did not consider all
of the relevant facts on a case by case
basis.
The Court recommended two primary considerations in deciding
whether a taxpayer's home office is his
principal place of business. In making
its decision, the trier of fact must consider the relative importance of the functions performed at each business location, as well as the amount of time spent
at each location.
The Court stated that the first consideration requires a comparative analysis of functions performed at each business location. The site where goods are
delivered and services rendered is necessary, but not sufficient, in determining whether the home office is the principal place of business. Furthermore, if
the nature of the business requires that
the services be rendered or the goods be
delivered at a facility with unique or
special characteristics, additional
weight is given to the facility as the
principal place of business.
Second, the Court stated that if the
comparative analysis yielded no definitive answer as to the principal place
of business, the factfinder should compare the amount of time spent at the
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